In the assessment of NATO’s readiness for war with Russia, there is also a warning about the Baltic states: what is the Kremlin’s wild card?

NATO and Lithuanian flag DELFI / Šarūnas Mažeika

According to Lrytas.lt, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) faces a new geopolitical reality with the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. While the Alliance has begun responding to emerging threats, its readiness for war with Russia is still questioned.

The Kyiv Independent writes that the threat of a full-scale conventional land war in Europe was once thought to be over.

Since then, officials have warned regularly of a renewed Russian threat to NATO, saying that the alliance must be ready for war in three, five or eight years.

“The Russian Federation has become a problem for world order, for democracy. This is Russia’s war against the democratic world. It is not just a war with Ukraine”, Romanian defence chief Gheorghita Vlad said in February this year.

After decades of fighting rebels rather than armies, underfunded European forces, the “peace dividend years” that followed the end of the Cold War and the shadow of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, NATO’s readiness for such a clash is in doubt.

“NATO could not defeat Russia with its current capabilities without incurring significant losses in casualties, damage and temporary loss of territorial sovereignty,” Gordon Davis, former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General, told The Kyiv Independent.

All 32 NATO members can mobilise a powerful and modern fighting force, but – at least the contingent in Europe – faces ammunition shortages, a fragmented defence industry and inadequate air defence coverage. There is also the question of unity and the willingness of Western societies to make sacrifices in a costly and protracted war.

NATO capabilities

Despite years of decline, NATO can still be capable.

In many respects, the European part of the Alliance can outperform Russia, boasting a significantly higher number of active duty troops, advanced long-range capabilities such as Taurus or Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, and a more critical, more modern air force.

By 2024, NATO, including the US, will have around 1.9 million active personnel, 2,400 combat-ready aircraft, and 6,650 tanks.

Meanwhile, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russia will have approximately 1.1 million active personnel, 1,370 aircraft, and 2,000 tanks.

NATO has also been strengthened by the accession of two new members, Sweden and Finland. These countries add two well-trained and interoperable armies and a border of more than 1,300 km to be defended by Russia.

“NATO still has a huge capability to kill and destroy, in terms of long-range fire, for example, from F-35s (modern jet fighters),” Ed Arnold, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told The Kyiv Independent.

“If Russia fought NATO forces as it is doing now in Ukraine, they would be wiped out pretty quickly,” he added, referring to Russia’s meat grinder tactics.

Davis agrees that NATO would have an advantage but would not avoid losses.

“Assuming only conventional combat, NATO would defeat Russia’s air force and navy, although its bombers, drones and submarines would succeed in hitting NATO territory and forces”, he said.

The expert added that the alliance “would defeat Russian ground forces, but not necessarily prevent them from taking territory”.

Many NATO planners have identified the Baltic countries as the most vulnerable to attack. In the event of a NATO-Russia war, Russian and Belarusian forces united through the 40 km wide Suwalki Corridor, which would cut off the only land route to all three Baltic countries.

The Wild Card

NATO may have the advantage in a rapid, “shock and awe” war, where its superior firepower would quickly destroy Russian forces. The Kyiv Independent asks the question – would a war with Russia be like that?

The Kremlin certainly knows its weaknesses and strengths. As the first year of the invasion showed, the Russian state and society were prepared to absorb the initial losses and recover from the long struggle.

“Most of the combat experience of NATO forces has been gained in Afghanistan, which is very different from what could happen in a potential NATO-Russia war,” Arnold explained to The Kyiv Independent.

In the 20 years of the Afghan war, some 3.6 thousand coalition troops have died. In Ukraine, an estimated 200,000 Russian military personnel have been killed in two and a half years.

Western societies are likely to be much more sensitive to casualties, and their factories and arms depots have proved unprepared even for long-term support for Ukraine.

Last month, insiders told the Kyiv Independent that one reason for the slow pace of US aid is the empty shelves at the Pentagon.

Meanwhile, the EU has been forced to postpone a promised 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine because of the “deplorable state of its defence industry”.

Instead of marching on Berlin or Paris, Russia could try to occupy and hold parts of the Baltic States and repel any counter-attack with the threat of massive – even nuclear – escalation.

Nuclear weapons remain a wild card, and the Kremlin does not shy away from threatening to use its nuclear arsenal. In a recent change of doctrine, Mr Putin has lowered the threshold for a nuclear response in an apparent attempt to draw attention to the Western powers.

Catching up with Russia

In a commentary for the Kyiv Independent, Mr Davis gave a shopping list of NATO’s main weaknesses.

“Integrated air and missile defence, persistent surveillance, long- and short-range strike systems (including crewless aerial vehicles), land-based electronic warfare, ground munitions stockpiles (e.g. artillery, mortars, anti-tank weapons) and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

NATO has exceptional capabilities in all these areas, but not enough in terms of large-scale, wide-area and deep-area stockpiles and defence production capabilities,” he explained.

One of the main reasons for these shortcomings was the peace dividend Europe received after the Cold War. Believing that the spectre of all-out conflict with Moscow had disappeared, European states reduced average defence funding from 2.4% to 1.6% of GDP between 1990 and 2000.

In the two decades after 1990, 24 countries abandoned conscription. While in 1990, the German, Italian, French, and British land forces could have had a fighting force of 550 battalions, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), this number had fallen to 163 battalions by 2020.

The US has also reduced its forces.

The Alliance has slowly started to react to the new realities since Russia launched the war in Ukraine and occupied Crimea in 2014.

“The good news is that since 2014, starting with the Wales Conference and every summit thereafter, we have increased NATO’s readiness,” retired US General Philip Breedlove said in an interview with The Kyiv Independent.

When asked whether NATO was ready to face Russia today, Mr Breedlove said, “No, but we are much better prepared than we were in 2014”.

The Welsh summit produced a Preparedness Action Plan to strengthen collective defence and deterrence.

Two years later, NATO began reinforcing its forward presence, deploying the first four and eight allied battalions along the Alliance’s eastern flank.

It could take up to two years

Preparations for war have gathered pace since Russia invaded Ukraine. At the 2022 Madrid summit, the allies adopted the NATO force model – a three-tier defence plan that would see 300,000 troops ready in a month and half a million in six months.

Air and naval readiness were also increased, and exercises were organised. For example, this year’s Steadfast Defender exercise, with 90,000 troops, was NATO’s most extensive exercise since the Cold War.

New funds have started flowing into defence. While in 2014, only three allies met the 2% of GDP threshold, a decade later, that number has risen to 19, including newcomer Sweden. Some members are even calling for an increase.

According to a CSIS analysis, European allies have increased their defence spending by around a third in 10 years, totalling USD 380 billion.

By comparison, Russia’s defence spending in the same year was around USD 110 billion, most of it on the war against Ukraine.

While these plans are impressive on paper, many face implementation difficulties. Efforts to mobilise 300,000 troops in one month are hampered by disagreements between the national and NATO authorities and low recruitment rates in member countries.

IISS analysts have pointed out that only a few European armies have increased in size over the past decade.

Despite new investment in defence production, Swedish Defence Minister Pal Jonsson told the Kyiv Independent earlier this year that artillery projectile production could take up to two years to reach desired levels.

Unclear policy and Trump’s shadow

Ultimately, implementing these ambitious plans depends on the unity and political will of individual members, which may be NATO’s Achilles heel.

The possible return of US presidential candidate Donald Trump to the White House is raising concerns in European capitals. The former President has famously stated that he will encourage Russia to do ‘whatever it wants’ with those members that do not comply with the defence spending criterion.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Hungary has repeatedly broken the allied consensus, and one official even suggested recently that Budapest would not resist a Russian invasion.

In addition, populist and radical political forces are rising in Slovakia, France, Germany and the Netherlands.

Fatigue is also growing across the Alliance, although current casualties are mostly limited to minor budget cuts and decommissioned military equipment.

“NATO’s main weakness at the moment is that people simply don’t agree on the Russian threat,” said Ed Arnold.

Another significant uncertainty is the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian forces are now fully engaged in the conflict and have suffered heavy casualties. Their ability to rebuild depends on when and how the war ends.

The decisive factor is ‘how’. Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur said earlier this month that if NATO wants to avoid a clash with Russian forces, it must help Ukraine win.

“If Russia succeeds in rebuilding, restructuring and adapting its defence capabilities, training and doctrine in the aftermath of the conflict with Ukraine, it will pose an even greater threat to NATO,” warned Mr Davis.

Based on information from The Kyiv Independent.

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